How threat actors are hijacking independent scientific voices, and the precise recovery protocol required to hold the line and reclaim your digital square.
I wish there was a way of sharing and storing your emails as I have said before either here or elsewhere where I somehow managed to get my previous comments accepted, but nothing I have tried in these directions works! Yes, I have personally come to realize that there definitely seems to be a concerted effort to try to ensure that your activities and the influence of them are being minimized as much as possible! Regards, Brent Collins.
The extortion economy exists because attackers still have leverage.
Most of the industry is optimized around detection, negotiation, recovery, insurance claims, and post-incident response. That’s an economy built around managing damage after execution has already occurred.
DataFenz attacks the leverage itself.
If unauthorized encryption never executes, the ransom conversation never starts.
If unauthorized exfiltration never succeeds, the blackmail leverage disappears.
That’s the strategic shift the market is slowly being forced toward. The conversation is moving from:
How fast can we recover?
How much cyber insurance do we need?
How do we negotiate with attackers?
to:
Why was the attacker allowed to execute against critical data in the first place?
The latest research is already showing that extortion is increasingly moving beyond encryption into pure data theft because attackers follow leverage wherever it exists.
That reinforces the core principle:
Access is not the problem. Execution authority is.
The future of data protection is not better dashboards explaining what happened.
The future is deterministic control over what is allowed to happen.
No exfiltration. No encryption. No leverage. No ransom.
That’s not resilience.
That’s preserving operational authority.
Jack Fitzpatrick Vice President - Data Protection DataFenz jack@DataFenz.com
Well, every-time GLADIO commits an attack, they schedule drills in the area. That way their operatives can justify their presence in the area.
Example: NATO was conducting a navy exercise in the Baltic when Nord Stream blew up. Also NATO was conducting a military drill in Spain at the time 10 trains blew up in 11 March 2004. A year later same operation in London trains.
Just pay attention. Theyll do it again.
Funny how non of the big Truther channels expose crisis cast there almost as untouchable as big pharma?
Crisiscast specialise in creating realistic "events' involving up to 400 crisis actors. Not something you want to broadcast.
Do we have the controllers of hidden hand these guys over see the FF operations abroad and Uk?
“As veterans of Israel’s elite intelligence units, our operatives conduct innovative, complex operations online and offline.” 😳
Thank you for this, David. I wondered why my X account was compromised... I didn't go as far into it as you, as I suspected some type fraud. Regardless, I lost my account that I held since Twitter first became public, and along with it, my audience. I'll review your article and see how/if I can get it back.
Shared this and good job presenting with Dr. Hodkinson et al. and vaccine child victims parents. Nice jersey's too : ) Wish you well on your research.
I wish there was a way of sharing and storing your emails as I have said before either here or elsewhere where I somehow managed to get my previous comments accepted, but nothing I have tried in these directions works! Yes, I have personally come to realize that there definitely seems to be a concerted effort to try to ensure that your activities and the influence of them are being minimized as much as possible! Regards, Brent Collins.
The extortion economy exists because attackers still have leverage.
Most of the industry is optimized around detection, negotiation, recovery, insurance claims, and post-incident response. That’s an economy built around managing damage after execution has already occurred.
DataFenz attacks the leverage itself.
If unauthorized encryption never executes, the ransom conversation never starts.
If unauthorized exfiltration never succeeds, the blackmail leverage disappears.
That’s the strategic shift the market is slowly being forced toward. The conversation is moving from:
How fast can we recover?
How much cyber insurance do we need?
How do we negotiate with attackers?
to:
Why was the attacker allowed to execute against critical data in the first place?
The latest research is already showing that extortion is increasingly moving beyond encryption into pure data theft because attackers follow leverage wherever it exists.
That reinforces the core principle:
Access is not the problem. Execution authority is.
The future of data protection is not better dashboards explaining what happened.
The future is deterministic control over what is allowed to happen.
No exfiltration. No encryption. No leverage. No ransom.
That’s not resilience.
That’s preserving operational authority.
Jack Fitzpatrick Vice President - Data Protection DataFenz jack@DataFenz.com
Well, every-time GLADIO commits an attack, they schedule drills in the area. That way their operatives can justify their presence in the area.
Example: NATO was conducting a navy exercise in the Baltic when Nord Stream blew up. Also NATO was conducting a military drill in Spain at the time 10 trains blew up in 11 March 2004. A year later same operation in London trains.
Just pay attention. Theyll do it again.
Funny how non of the big Truther channels expose crisis cast there almost as untouchable as big pharma?
Crisiscast specialise in creating realistic "events' involving up to 400 crisis actors. Not something you want to broadcast.
Do we have the controllers of hidden hand these guys over see the FF operations abroad and Uk?
“As veterans of Israel’s elite intelligence units, our operatives conduct innovative, complex operations online and offline.” 😳
https://www.blackcube.com/
https://crisiscast.com/
Thank you for this, David. I wondered why my X account was compromised... I didn't go as far into it as you, as I suspected some type fraud. Regardless, I lost my account that I held since Twitter first became public, and along with it, my audience. I'll review your article and see how/if I can get it back.